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PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_ 
 
No. 19-1049 
_ 
 
 
ARTURO NICOLA ESPICHAN, 
AKA Arturo Espichan Izaguirre, 
 
Petitioner 
 
v.  
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES OF 
AMERICA 
       
   _ 
 
On Petition for Review of a Final Order  
of the Board of Immigration Appeals 
Immigration Judge: Leo Finston 
(No. A042-288-321) 
_ 
Argued September 24, 2019 
 
Before: McKEE, AMBRO, and ROTH, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: December 27, 2019) 
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Kristina C. Ivtindzioski (Argued) 
161 Madison Avenue 
Third Floor 
Morristown, NJ  07960 
 
 Counsel for Petitioner 
 
Joseph H. Hunt 
    Assistant Attorney General, Civil Division 
Stephen J. Flynn 
    Assistant Director, Office of Immigration Litigation 
Arthur L. Rabin (Argued) 
United States Department of Justice 
Office of Immigration Litigation 
P.O. Box 878 
Ben Franklin Station 
Washington, DC  20044 
 
 Counsel for Respondent 
_ 
 
OPINION OF  THE  COURT 
_ 
 
AMBRO, Circuit Judge 
INTRODUCTION 
Arturo Nicola Espichan came to the United States from 
Peru as a 14-year-old to live with his father, who shortly after 
became a U.S. citizen.  When the Government later sought to 
deport Espichan for having committed an aggravated felony, 
he claimed he was not an alien but a U.S. citizen, having 
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derived citizenship from his father under a then-existing 
statute—§ 321(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act 
(“INA”), 8 U.S.C. § 1432(a) (repealed 2000).  To meet that 
provision’s requirements, Espichan needs to show that his 
parents had a “legal separation.”  The Government claims he 
cannot do so because, to be separated legally, you must first be 
married, and it asserts Espichan’s parents were not.   
Because Espichan’s nationality claim presents a 
genuine issue of material fact—whether his parents were 
married—we transfer the case to a U.S. district court for a 
hearing and decision on that issue.  If the court finds that 
Espichan’s parents were married, then we hold as a matter of 
law that Espichan has satisfied all requirements under 
§ 1432(a)(3)–(5) for derivative citizenship and so may not be 
removed. 
I. BACKGROUND 
The following facts are not in dispute.  Espichan is a 
native and citizen of Peru born in May 1975 to German 
Espichan and Margarita Izaguirre.  His father came to the U.S. 
as a lawful permanent resident in 1979.  He got custody of 
Espichan in August 1986 per a power of attorney signed by 
Espichan’s mother at the U.S. consulate in Peru.  In February 
1990, Espichan’s mother filed a complaint at the police 
headquarters in Callao, Peru, declaring as a matter of public 
record that she and Espichan’s father, having lived together 
since 1970, separated in 1979.    
Espichan’s father petitioned for him to come to the U.S. 
as a lawful permanent resident, and Espichan, then 14, arrived 
in March 1990.  Later that month, his father became a U.S. 
citizen.   
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Fast forward to 2016, when the Department of 
Homeland Security (“DHS”) charged Espichan with being an 
alien convicted of an aggravated felony, hence subject to 
removal under § 237(a)(2)(A)(iii) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii).   
Espichan contested his removability before the IJ at his 
removal hearing, arguing that he had acquired derivative 
citizenship through his father under 8 U.S.C. § 1432(a)(3), the 
applicable law at the time of his alleged naturalization, see 
Morgan v. Att’y Gen., 432 F.3d 226, 230 (3d Cir. 2005), 
because his parents were legally separated at the time of his 
father’s naturalization.  The IJ rejected this claim, finding there 
could be no legal separation because DHS came forward with 
“unequivocal evidence” that Espichan’s father “never held 
himself out to be married” to Espichan’s mother.  Accordingly, 
he concluded that Espichan had not established U.S. 
citizenship and ordered him removed to Peru.  The Board of 
Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) affirmed, and Espichan petitions 
us for review. 
II. JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(5) allows judicial review of removal 
orders in the appropriate court of appeals when the nationality 
of the petitioner is uncertain and gives us jurisdiction over that 
issue.  See Dessouki v. Att’y Gen., 915 F.3d 964, 966 (3d Cir. 
2019).  If “from the pleadings and affidavits” we believe that 
“no genuine issue of material fact about the petitioner’s 
nationality is presented,” then we “shall decide the nationality 
claim.”  8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(5)(A).  If, however, there is a 
genuine issue of material fact about the petitioner’s nationality, 
per 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(5)(B) we “transfer the proceeding to 
the district court of the United States for the judicial district in 
which the petitioner resides for a new hearing.” 
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 While our review of the nationality claim is 
unrestricted, it is limited to questions of law.  See Morgan, 432 
F.3d at 229.  Where the “ʻBIA’s opinion directly states that the 
BIA is deferring to the IJ, or invokes specific aspects of the IJ’s 
analysis and factfinding in support of the BIA’s conclusions,’ 
we review both decisions.”  Uddin v. Att’y Gen., 870 F.3d 282, 
289 (3d Cir. 2017) (internal citation omitted).  Here the BIA 
invoked specific aspects of the IJ’s decision, so we review both 
decisions to determine whether a genuine issue of material fact 
exists as to Espichan’s nationality.                        
III. ANALYSIS 
 On his petition for review, Espichan asks us to decide 
his nationality claim as a matter of law, as he contends he has 
proven that his parents had a de facto marriage and, 
subsequently, a legal separation under Peruvian law.  In the 
alternative, he argues that he has presented at the least a 
genuine issue of material fact as to his nationality that should 
be decided by a district court.  Before turning to the claim itself, 
we address the appropriate standard to determine whether a 
genuine issue of material fact exists. 
A.  We Use the Summary Judgment Standard When 
Determining Whether a Genuine Issue of Material 
Fact Exists. 
Joseph v. Att’y Gen., 421 F.3d 224, 229 (3d Cir. 2005), 
points the path to determine whether there is a genuine issue of 
material fact about Espichan’s nationality.  It adopts our typical 
summary judgment standard: the moving party “bears the 
burden of establishing that no genuine issue of material fact 
exists and that the undisputed facts establish [its] right to 
judgment as a matter of law;” and “all factual inferences [flow] 
in favor of . . . the nonmoving party.”  Id. at 230 (internal 
citation omitted).  Here the Government is the moving party 
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because it is seeking “what amounts to summary judgment” in 
terms of having Espichan declared removable.  Id. 
The Government, however, contends that our case 
Bagot v. Ashcroft, 398 F.3d 252 (3d Cir. 2005), controls on 
whom the burden rests because we are making a citizenship 
determination.  According to Bagot, the “burden of proof of 
eligibility for citizenship is on the applicant,” and so “[a]ll 
doubts ‘should be resolved in favor of the United States and 
against the claimant.”  Id. at 256–57 (internal citation omitted).  
The Government attempts to distinguish Joseph on the ground 
that it is “on weaker footing than Bagot when it comes to 
inferences” because Joseph fails “to acknowledge or account 
for the Supreme Court’s admonition in United States v. 
MacIntosh that ‘[c]itzenship is a high privilege, and when 
doubts exist concerning a grant of it, generally at least, they 
should be resolved in favor of the United States and against the 
claimant.’”  Gov. Br. at 17 n.7 (quoting United States v. 
MacIntosh, 283 U.S. 605, 626 (1931)).   
This argument fails for two reasons. 
First, in Joseph we were determining under 
§ 1252(b)(5)(B) whether a genuine dispute of material fact 
existed as to that petitioner’s nationality, making it appropriate 
to transfer the case to a district court.  421 F.3d at 229-230.  In 
Bagot, by contrast, we were determining the merits of a 
nationality claim itself that came to us on a habeas petition.  
398 F.3d at 253-54.  Thus, while it is appropriate to place the 
burden of proving citizenship on the applicant when deciding 
the merits of a nationality claim, the case directly on point here, 
Joseph, tells us that the burden is on the Government to show 
there is no genuine dispute of material fact that requires 
resolution by the factfinder.  
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Second, Joseph is on no weaker footing than Bagot 
when it comes to Supreme Court precedent.  The former relied 
on the Supreme Court’s decision in Agosto v. INS, 436 U.S. 
748 (1978), which interpreted § 106(a)(5)(B) of the INA 
(repealed 1996)1—the predecessor to our current jurisdictional 
statute that uses language almost identical to that in 
§ 1252(b)(5).  Agosto determined that because the “statutory 
language [in § 106(a)(5)(B)] is virtually identical to that 
embodied in Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 56, which governs summary 
judgment motions,” it is reasonable to “assume that, in using 
the language from Rule 56 as the standard for granting de novo 
district court hearings on citizenship claims, Congress intended 
the language to be interpreted similarly to that in Rule 56.”  Id. 
at 754.  When Agosto was decided, it was well established that, 
on Rule 56 motions for summary judgment, the burden to show 
                                              
1 § 106(a)(5)(B) of the INA (repealed 1996) provided that  
 
whenever any petitioner, who seeks review of an 
order under this section, claims to be a national 
of the United States and makes a showing that 
his claim is not frivolous, the court shall (A) pass 
upon the issues presented when it appears from 
the pleadings and affidavits filed by the parties 
that no genuine issue of material fact is 
presented; or (B) where a genuine issue of 
material fact as to the petitioner’s nationality is 
presented, transfer the proceedings to a United 
States district court for the district where the 
petitioner has his residence for hearing de novo 
of the nationality claim and determination as if 
such proceedings were originally initiated in the 
district court under the provisions of section 
2201 of title 28. . . . 
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the absence of a genuine issue of fact was on the moving party 
and all inferences were in favor of the nonmoving party.  See 
Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970). 
Additionally, Agosto, which was decided long after MacIntosh, 
made no mention of the earlier case’s admonition regarding the 
high burden of proving citizenship when considering whether 
we should use the summary judgment standard and draw all 
inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. 
Accordingly, in determining whether a petitioner’s 
nationality presents a genuine issue of material fact, we follow 
Joseph’s directive and require the Government to demonstrate 
that there is a lack of such an issue while drawing all inferences 
in favor of the petitioner.  When deciding the merits of such a 
claim, however, Bagot controls and the burden of proving 
citizenship is on the petitioner.  
B.  Espichan’s Nationality Claim 
We now come to the heart of the case: whether 
Espichan’s nationality claim presents a genuine issue of 
material fact to warrant a fresh hearing by a district court.  
Espichan claims that he derived citizenship through his father 
under 8 U.S.C. § 1432(a)(3).  It provides in relevant part that 
citizenship is automatically acquired by a child born outside 
the U.S. to alien parents on “[t]he naturalization of the parent 
having legal custody of the child when there has been a legal 
separation of the parents.”2   
                                              
2 The child must also be under the age of 18 at the time of the 
naturalization and have been residing in the United States 
“pursuant to a lawful admission for permanent residence” at 
the time of the parent’s naturalization.  8 U.S.C. § 1432(a)(4)–
(5).  Neither party disputes that Espichan has satisfied these 
conditions.    
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While § 1432(a) refers only to a “legal separation” 
between an alien’s parents for derivative citizenship, we have 
interpreted the statute, no doubt out of logic, to require a 
marriage as the requisite antecedent to a “legal separation.”  
See, e.g., Dessouki, 915 F.3d at 967 (“Dessouki bases his 
citizenship claim on his father’s naturalization [under 
§ 1432(a)].  But the relevant law requires his parents to have 
once been married.”).  Accordingly, our first step is to 
determine whether the evidence in the record presents a 
genuine issue of material fact as to the marriage of Espichan’s 
parents.  If so, we may turn to whether there was a legal 
separation.  
1. The Record Presents a Genuine Issue of Material Fact 
Whether Espichan’s Parents Were Married.  
At the time Espichan’s parents were allegedly married, they 
both lived in Peru, so Peruvian law controls.  Morgan, 432 F.3d 
at 234.  That law expressly recognizes de facto marital unions.  
The Peruvian Civil Code of 1936, the law in effect when 
Espichan claims his parents were married, provided for and 
defined marital union in fact as “[t]he stable union of a man 
and a woman, free from any impediment to marry, who make 
up a de facto household in compliance with the time and 
conditions foreseen by the law, resulting in a community 
property subject to the regime of conjugal partnership where 
applicable.”  J.A. 91.  Similarly, Article 326 of the Peruvian 
Civil Code of 1984, the law in force at the time of Espichan’s 
father’s U.S. naturalization in 1990,3 provides that a “union in 
                                              
3 Under Morgan the applicable law is that “in effect at the time 
the critical events giving rise to the claim for derivative 
citizenship occurred.”  432 F.3d at 230.  Thus, while the Civil 
Code of 1936 governed the actual marriage itself, the Civil 
Code of 1984 governed at the time Espichan’s father sought to 
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fact, voluntarily made between a man and a woman, free of 
matrimonial impediment, to achieve purposes and fulfill duties 
similar to those of marriage, originates a society of assets 
subject to the regime of community of acquisitions.”  J.A. 79.  
Article 9 of the Peruvian Constitution of 1979 also explicitly 
recognizes a de facto marriage—a “union of a man and a 
woman, free from any impediment to marriage, who form a de 
facto family . . . leads to a property system subject to the marital 
property system.”  J.A. 75.   
Espichan presented documentary evidence in the form 
of affidavits signed in 2018, a 1990 police report, and a legal 
memorandum prepared by a Peruvian law firm, tending to 
show that his parents had a de facto marriage under Peruvian 
law.  He presented his mother’s affidavit attesting that in 1970 
she “got married in Pusacocha Lagoon, according to the Pashas 
Culture [part of the Incan Indian community], with a simple 
ceremony,” and that “[a]long with Mr. German Espichan, we 
accepted to be married under the tradition of the Pashas.”  She 
also declared that “I started a married life with Mr. German 
Espichan, making then a legal coexistence.”  J.A. 56.  Espichan 
then introduced his father’s affidavit attesting that “[i]n Peru, I 
maintained a convivial relationship with Ms. Margarita 
Izaguirre, which we initiated since September 23, 1970,” and 
“we accepted to having a traditional matrimony . . . at the 
Pusacocha Lagoon, according to the traditions of the Pashas 
culture, with a simple ceremony.”  J.A. 60.  Further, he 
declared that “[s]ince that September 23, 1970, [I] started a 
married life with Mrs. Margarita Izaguirre, making a legal 
                                              
naturalize.  Both, however, recognize a de facto marriage.  See 
also Minasyan v. Gonzales, 401 F.3d 1069, 1077 (9th Cir. 
2005) (looking at the marital law in place in California, the 
relevant jurisdiction, at both the time of naturalization and 
marriage). 
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coexistence.”  J.A. 60.  Espichan also submitted his aunt’s 
affidavit attesting that she attended his parents’ traditional 
marital ceremony.  J.A. 63.  
That was not all.  Espichan presented a police complaint 
filed by his mother in February 1990 declaring that “German 
Nicolas Espichan Bondani [and] . . . Margarita Justina 
Izaguirre Soto . . . lived together from 1970 to 1979” and 
“during the years of living together [] had three children.”  J.A. 
49.  Finally, Espichan introduced a legal memorandum from a 
law firm in Peru summarizing the provisions of Peruvian law 
that recognize de facto marital unions, explaining that they are 
a “deep-rooted custom,” and concluding that Espichan’s 
parents had formed a “de facto marital union” under Peruvian 
law.  J.A. 91, 94. 
The Government, on the other hand, argues that, as a 
matter of law, Espichan’s parents were never married because 
DHS presented evidence to the IJ tending to show that there 
was no marriage.  It points to three items: First, Espichan’s 
father’s Application to File Petition for Naturalization did not 
list a marriage to Espichan’s mother despite listing three other 
marriages.  J.A. 51.  Second, Espichan’s mother’s Application 
for Naturalization indicated that she was “Single, Never 
Married.”  A.R. 624.  And finally, a 1989 affidavit signed by 
Espichan’s father (submitted as part of his efforts to obtain 
legal status for his son) declared that he had never been married 
to Espichan’s mother.  J.A. 53.  
The Government disputes the credibility of Espichan’s 
evidence in an attempt to show there is not a genuine dispute 
of material fact.  But under Joseph we refrain from making 
credibility determinations and draw all inferences in favor of 
Espichan.  421 F.3d at 231–32.  He offers plausible 
explanations for why his parents failed to state that they were 
married—for example, they may not have understood that 
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“marriage” as written on their official immigration forms 
included de facto marriages.  See Pet’r Br. at 12–13.  But that 
is not for us to decide.  Thus there is a genuine dispute of 
material fact whether Espichan’s parents were married under 
Peruvian law.  
2. If Espichan’s Parents Were Married, Then Their 
Separation Is a “Legal Separation” Under § 1432(a)(3) 
as a Matter of Law. 
Even if Espichan’s parents were married (and we 
assume so in this Section), we must still decide the issue of 
legal separation that occurs “only upon a formal governmental 
action . . . that[,] under the laws of a state or nation having 
jurisdiction over the marriage, alters the marital relationship of 
the parties.”  Morgan, 432 F.3d at 234.  In Morgan the laws of 
the relevant jurisdictions—Jamaica and Pennsylvania—both 
required a formal judicial decree for legal separation.  Id. at 
233–34.  But we expressly acknowledged that there may be a 
case where the relevant jurisdiction does not require any 
“governmental imprimatur” for parties to become “legally 
separated.”  Id. at 234 n.4.  This is that case.   
Article 326 of the Peruvian Civil Code of 1984 provides 
that “[a] union in fact ends by death, absence, mutual 
agreement, or unilateral decision.”  J.A. 79.  And here Espichan 
gave evidence showing that his parents dissolved their de facto 
marital union under Peruvian law.  He introduced the police 
complaint filed with the Callao Police Headquarters in 
February 1990 stating that “German Nicolas Espichan 
Bondani” and “Margarita Justina Izaguirre Soto” “let it be 
known having lived together from 1970 to 1979 and by mutual 
agreement have made the decision to separate.”  J.A. 49.   
The Government disputes this characterization of the 
police complaint.  But its arguments come up short.  First, it 
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contends the police complaint is more akin to a child custody 
determination because the complaint includes a reference to 
the couple’s children (“likewise it is known that during the 
years of living together they had three children . . .”).  J.A. 49.  
But this overlooks that, several years prior to filing the 
complaint, Espichan’s mother signed a power of attorney 
granting full custody of Espichan to his father.  J.A. 47.  
Second, the Government casts doubt on the mutual nature of 
the separation, arguing that it is not clear that Espichan’s father 
was a party to the police complaint.  Yet this does not show 
that the complaint was not mutual, especially in light of the 
2018 affidavit in which Espichan’s father declared that “I have 
true knowledge that my ex-wife, Ms. Margarita Izaguirre[,] 
presented to the Commissary of Callao, on February 19, 1990, 
a document with the purpose of giving validity to the 
separation by mutual agreement.”  J.A. 61.  Moreover, 
Peruvian law does not require separations to be mutual—a de 
facto marriage may end by “unilateral decision.”  J.A. 79.    
Because the Government has failed to rebut Espichan’s 
evidence tending to show that his parents had a legal 
separation, there is no genuine issue of material fact, and we 
may decide the issue as a matter of law.  8 U.S.C. 
§ 1252(b)(5)(A).   
Espichan now bears the burden of proving the merits of 
his citizenship claim by a preponderance of the evidence.  See 
Bagot, 398 F.3d at 256; In re Rodriguez-Tejedor, 23 I. & N. 
Dec. 153, 164 (BIA 2001).  He has met his burden insofar as 
the legal separation issue is concerned.  The police complaint, 
an official record with a clear declaration of separation, 
demonstrates by a preponderance of the evidence that his 
parents had a legal separation under Peruvian law in 1979, 11 
years before his father naturalized.  
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 Accordingly, if the District Court finds that the parents 
of Espichan were married, then he would have fully satisfied 
§ 1432(a)(3)’s requirement for a legal separation.  And because 
there is no dispute as to the other requirements for § 1432(a) 
derivative citizenship, Espichan would have met his burden of 
proving that he derived U.S. citizenship through his father. 
*    *    *    *    * 
Whether the parents of Espichan were married is a 
genuine issue of material fact, and he has demonstrated that a 
legal separation occurred in the event his parents are found to 
have been married.  We therefore vacate the BIA’s decision 
affirming the IJ’s denial of Espichan’s citizenship claim and 
transfer this petition for review to the District of New Jersey 
(where Espichan is currently detained) for a de novo hearing.  
The sole issue is whether his mother and father were married 
under Peruvian law.  See Rosales v. Lynch, 821 F.3d 625, 631–
32 (5th Cir. 2016).  If not, he loses.  But if the District Court 
finds that they were married, then, as a matter of law, Espichan 
has satisfied 8 U.S.C. § 1432(a)(3)’s “legal separation” 
requirement, and he will have met his burden of proving 
derivative U.S. citizenship.  Because an American citizen is not 
removable under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2), the District Court 
should then enter a final judgment terminating removal 
proceedings.  See 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a) (granting district courts 
the authority to create a remedy with the force of a final 
judgment). 
 We retain jurisdiction over this case if there is a further 
appeal.  
